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Abstract
We have studied an evolutionary game with spatially arranged players who can choose one of the two strategies (named cooperation
and defection for social dilemmas) when playing with their neighbors. In addition to the application of the usual strategies in the
present model the players are also characterized by one of the two extreme personal features representing the egoist or fraternal
behavior. During the evolution each player can modify both her own strategy and/or personal feature via a myopic update process
in order to improve her utility. The results of numerical simulations and stability analysis are summarized in phase diagrams
representing a wide scale of spatially ordered distribution of strategies and personal features when varying the payoff parameters. In
most of the cases only two of the four possible options prevail and may form sublattice ordered spatial structure. The evolutionary
advantage of the fraternal attitude is demonstrated within a large range of payoff parameters including the region of prisoner’s
dilemma where egoist defectors and fraternal cooperators form a role-separating chessboard-like pattern.
Keywords: evolutionary games, social dilemmas, egoism, fraternity
1. Introduction
Multi-agent game theoretical models give us a general math-
ematical tool to describe real-life situations in human societies
and to study biological systems when varying the interactions,
evolutionary rules, and connectivity structure among the play-
ers (Maynard Smith, 1982; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund, 2010;
Pacheco et al., 2008). In many cases the interactions are ap-
proximated by the sum of pair interactions between neighbor-
ing (equivalent) players distributed on the sites of a lattice or
graph (for a survey see (Nowak and May, 1993; Szabo´ and Fa´th,
2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010)). The simplest spatial versions
of two-strategy games have demonstrated new outcomes of evo-
lutionary process, which are missing if well-mixed players are
postulated.
To give an example, the most exhaustively studied symmet-
ric two-person two-strategy game is the so-called Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game where the equivalent players can choose
cooperation or defection. For mutual cooperation (defection)
both players receive a payoff R (P) while for their opposite
decisions the cooperator (defector) gains S (T ). For the PD
game the payoffs satisfy the conditions: S < P < R < T , that
enforces both selfish players to choose defection (representing
the state called the ”tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968))
meanwhile the mutual cooperation would be more beneficial
for the players. Being trapped in the state of mutual defec-
tion is in stark contrast to our everyday experience of high level
of cooperation. To resolve this discrepancy several cooperation
supporting conditions and mechanisms were identified (Nowak,
2006b; Pacheco et al., 2006a; Fu et al., 2009; Poncela et al.,
2009; Pacheco et al., 2006b; Tomassini et al., 2010; Go´mez-
Garden˜es et al., 2008; Fort, 2008; Perc, 2011; Vukov et al.,
2011; Fu et al., 2012; Pinheiro et al., 2012). Alternative ways
to explain the emergence of cooperation are originated from the
observation that humans follow more complex behavior that
cannot be well described by simple unconditional cooperator
and defector acts. Human experiments (Fehr and Falk, 2002;
Camerer, 2003; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund, 2010; Traulsen et al.,
2010) highlighted that individuals possess different personal
features or emotions (Szolnoki et al., 2011), e.g., selfish (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), altruistic (Sigmund et al.,
2002), fraternal (Scheuring, 2010; Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2011),
punishing (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002; Kurzban and Houser, 2005), reciprocative (Berg et al.,
1995), envy (Garay and Mori, 2011; Szolnoki et al., 2011), just
to name a few examples. Following this avenue, now we intro-
duce a spatial model where players are not limited to the use
of the pure cooperator and defector strategies but they are also
motivated by an additional personal feature characterizing their
egoist or fraternal attitude. Accordingly, the present work gen-
eralizes and extends previous specific efforts about the conse-
quences of collective decisions (Szabo´ et al., 2010) and other-
regarding preferences for a uniform level of fraternal behavior
(Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2011). Here it is worth mentioning that
the fraternal behavior can prevent the society from falling into
the ”tragedy of commons” state. Consequently, the advantage
of the fraternal behavior can be interpreted as an evolutionary
driving force supporting societies to maintain/develop the altru-
istic personal features. Studying the present model we wish to
explore the consequences of the spatial competition (evolution-
ary process) between the above described strategy profiles. It
is emphasized, furthermore, that for the quantum games (Abal
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011) the players exhibit a behavior simi-
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lar to those played by fraternal players.
For the sake of comparison the present analysis is also per-
formed for all 2 × 2 social dilemmas games [including PD,
Hawk-Dove (HD) and Stag-Hunt (SH) games] when varying
the values of T and S (for R = 1 and P = 0 without loss of
generality). Finally we mention that the present four-strategy
model is analogous to those cases when the spatial social dilem-
mas are studied by considering voluntary participation (Szabo´
and Hauert, 2002), punishments (Rand et al., 2009; Sekiguchi
and Nakamaru, 2009; Helbing et al., 2010), and the use of
sophisticated strategies like Tit-for-tat (Nowak and Sigmund,
1992) or others (Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006; Rand
et al., 2009).
Due to the biological motivations (Maynard Smith, 1982) in
the early evolutionary games the time-dependence of the strat-
egy distribution is controlled by the imitation of a better per-
forming neighbor. In human societies, however, we can assume
more intelligent players who are capable to evaluate their ficti-
tious payoff variation when modifying strategy (Sysi-Aho et al.,
2005; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007). The corresponding so-called my-
opic evolutionary rule is analogous to the Glauber dynamics
(Glauber, 1963) used frequently in the investigation of station-
ary states and dynamical processes for the kinetic Ising model
(Binder and Hermann, 1988). In biological systems the latter
mechanism can be interpreted as the survival of possible mu-
tants with a probability increasing with the current fitness. Con-
trary to the imitation of a neighbor, the mentioned myopic dy-
namical rule permits the formation of sublattice ordered distri-
bution of strategies (and/or personalities) resembling the anti-
ferromagnetic structure in the Ising systems. For the case of
spatial PD the chessboard like arrangement of cooperators and
defectors is favored if T + S > 2R. This latter criterion coin-
cides with those one when the players have the highest average
income in the repeated two-person PD game if they alternate
cooperation and defection in opposite phase.
It will be demonstrated that the present model exhibits dif-
ferent disordered and sublattice ordered spatial arrangements
as well as phase transitions when varying the payoff parameters
for several fixed levels of noise. It means that in contrary to
preliminary/naive expectation the fraternal players may survive
in the presence of egoist competitors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we de-
scribe our four-strategy lattice model. The results of Monte
Carlo (MC) simulations at a fixed noise level are detailed in
Sec. 3 while phase diagram in the low noise limit are discussed
in Sec. 4. This diagram can be obtained by means of stability
analysis of the possible two-strategy phases against the point
defects. The essence of this method and an analytical estima-
tion for the direction of interfacial invasion between the men-
tioned phases are briefly described in Sec. 5. Finally, we sum-
marize our main finding and discuss their implications.
2. The model
In the present model the players are located on the sites of a
square lattice with L × L sites. The undesired effects of bound-
aries are eliminated by using periodic boundary conditions in
the simulations. At each site x four types of players are distin-
guished, namely, sx = De, Ce, D f , and C f . In our notation De
and Ce refer to egoist defector and cooperator while D f and C f
denote fraternal defector and cooperator for the PD games. For
other types of games (e.g., HD or SH) we will use the above-
mentioned abbreviations of types that we call strategies hence-
forth. In the mathematical formulation of utilities these strate-
gies are denoted by the following unit vectors:
De =

1
0
0
0

, Ce =

0
1
0
0

, D f =

0
0
1
0

, C f =

0
0
0
1

. (1)
The utility U(sx) of the player x (with a strategy sx) comes
from games with her four nearest neighbors and can be ex-
pressed by the following sum of matrix products:
U(sx) =
∑
δ
sx · Asx+δ. (2)
Here the summation runs over the four nearest neighboring sites
of x and the payoff matrix A is given as
A =

0 T 0 T
S 1 S 1
0 σ 0 σ
σ 1 σ 1

(3)
whereσ = (T+S )/2. The matrix elements in the upper-left 2×2
block of the whole payoff matrix define the payoffs between
egoist players (De and Ce). The present notation is adopted
from the literature of social dilemmas where T refers to ”temp-
tation to choose defection”, S is abbreviation of ”sucker’s pay-
off”, the ”punishment for mutual defection” is chosen to be zero
(i.e., P = 0), and the ”reward for mutual cooperation” is set
R = 1 for a suitable unit. In contrary to the egoist individu-
als the fraternal players revalue their payoffs by assuming equal
sharing of the common income. In other words, the fraternal
players wish to maximize their common income therefore their
utility is expressed by a partnership game (Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998) represented by the lower-right 2 × 2 block of the
payoff matrix (3). It is emphasized that the utility of a given
player is based on her own character and is independent of the
personal feature (egoist or fraternal) of the co-players. Notice,
furthermore, that for the present symmetric game the pair of
egoist and fraternal players have the same utility (1 or 0) if both
follow the same strategy (cooperation or defection).
The main advantage of the present approach is that we have
only two payoff parameters (T and S ) when studying the com-
petition between the egoist and fraternal players. Further ad-
vantage of this parametrization is that the spatial evolutionary
game with only egoist (or fraternal) players were already stud-
ied for myopic strategy update at arbitrary payoffs (Szabo´ et al.,
2010; Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2011) and the results will serve as
references for later comparisons. Accordingly, in each elemen-
tary step we choose a player x at random and her strategy is
changed from sx to s′x (chosen at random, too) with a probabil-
ity
W(sx → s′x) =
1
1 + exp[(U(sx) − U(s′x))/K]
, (4)
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where K describes the noise amplitude disturbing the players to
achieve their optimum utility. It is worth noting that not only
the “best myopic response” is allowed according to the sug-
gested strategy update protocol. Less favorable changes, with
smaller probability, are also possible. This freedom of micro-
scopic dynamics makes possible to avoid frozen states reported
by Sysi-Aho et al. (2005). The iteration of these elementary
steps drives the system from any initial state to a final station-
ary one that is characterized by its own spatial structure and by
the strategy frequencies.
To characterize the wide scale of ordered states we intro-
duced four sublattices (with representative sites forming a 2× 2
block) as it is used in the investigation of several Ising models
previously (Binder and Landau, 1980). In the stationary state
the average strategy frequencies are determined in each sub-
lattices. Both the quantitative analysis and the visualization of
the spatial strategy distributions have justified, however, that
the behavior of the present system can be well described by
a simpler, two-sublattice formalism we use henceforth. More
precisely, the square lattice is divided into two sublattices (re-
sembling the chessboard like distinction of sites), α = 1 and
2, and the spatial distribution is described by the strategy fre-
quencies ρα,s (s = De,Ce, D f , and C f ) in both sublattices. Ev-
idently, ∑s ρα,s = 1 for α = 1, 2. For later convenience in sev-
eral plots the emerging ordered phase is also characterized by
the sum of the total frequencies of two strategies, for example,
ν(Ce+C f ) = ∑α(ρα,Ce+ρα,C f )/2 denotes the average frequency
of Ce and C f strategies in the whole system.
The quantitative analysis has justified that all the possible
two-strategy subsystems will play relevant role in the station-
ary behavior of this system. Two possible subsystems, when
only egoist (sx = De,Ce) or fraternal (sx = D f ,C f ) strate-
gies are permitted, have already been mentioned above (Szabo´
and Szolnoki, 2011). In addition we have two trivial cases,
when only cooperative (more precisely sx = Ce,C f ) or de-
fective (sx = De, D f ) strategies are permitted in the system.
In both cases the players get the same utility independently of
the local arrangement of personal features. Consequently, the
”cooperative” (or ”defective”) strategies can coexist in a ran-
dom, time-dependent structure resembling the high noise limit
(K → ∞) for any pair of strategies. For the other two possibil-
ities (sx = De,C f or sx = Ce, D f ) the corresponding subsystem
can be mapped into the case of egoist players with a suitable
transformation of payoff parameters.
3. Monte Carlo results
The present model is systematically analyzed by MC simula-
tions when varying the payoff parameters (T and S ) for a fixed
noise level, K = 0.25. During the simulations we have de-
termined the strategy frequencies in both sublattices (ρα,s) and
the average payoff per capita in the final stationary state. The
system size is varied from L = 400 to 2000 in order to have suf-
ficiently accurate statistical data (the statistical errors are com-
parable to the line thickness). The larger system sizes are used
when approaching the critical transitions belonging to the Ising
universality class (Szabo´ et al., 2010). Simultaneously, the un-
desired effects of the divergency of relaxation time and of the
fluctuation (multiplied by the system size) at the critical points
(Stanley, 1971) are reduced by the increase of sampling and
thermalization time from ts = tth = 104 to 106 MCS (1 MCS =
L × L elementary steps described above) when approaching the
transition points. As a result, our numerical data exhibit smooth
variation even in the vicinity of the critical points.
If the system is started from a random initial state, then one
can observe growing domains yielding the above mentioned
sublattice ordered arrangement of strategies. The general fea-
tures of this phenomenon is already well described in the liter-
ature of ordering process (for a survey see (Bray, 1994)). As
the typical size l of domains grows algebraically with the time
(more precisely, l ∝ t1/2) therefore we need extremely long
relaxation time to approach the final (mono-domain) ordered
structure for large sizes. The latter difficulty is avoided by start-
ing the consecutive simulations from a prepared, partially or-
dered initial states whose symmetry agrees with those of the
final stationary state.
First we illustrate the variation of strategy distributions by
four snapshots obtained for different values of T at fixed values
of S and noise K. The first snapshot (at T = 0.3, S = 1.5,
and K = 0.25) of Fig. 1 shows a random distribution of Ce and
C f strategies decorated rarely with the presence of D f strat-
egy. For these payoff values ρD f → 0 in the zero noise limit.
a b
c d
De: Ce: Df : Cf :
Figure 1: Typical (40 × 40) snapshots of strategy distributions in the stationary
states for S = 1.5 and K = 0.25 if T = 0.3 (a), 1.0 (b), 1.5 (c), and 2.2 (d). The
strategy colors are indicated at the top.
In snapshot b of Fig. 1 (T = 1) one can observe a sublattice
ordered arrangement of Ce and D f strategies with a low fre-
quency of point defects. Surprisingly, for a significantly higher
value of T (see snapshot d) the simulations have indicated an-
other sublattice ordered arrangement composed of De and C f
strategies. The transition between the latter two patterns is con-
tinuous as represented by snapshot c where locally both types
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of the ordered structures are recognizable. It is more interest-
ing, however, that within the intermediate region C f strategy is
replaced for Ce within one of the sublattices and simultaneously
the players with strategy D f (in the complementary sublattice)
modify their strategy to De. In other words, a sublattice ordered
structure is present permanently meanwhile the strategy com-
position varies smoothly in both sublattices.
The above mentioned process is quantified by an appropriate
combination of strategy frequencies (e.g., ν(De + C f )) as illus-
trated in Fig. 2 when increasing the value of T . At the top of
this figure the positions of the labels a, b, c, and d indicate the
value of T for which the strategy distributions are shown in the
corresponding snapshots of Fig. 1. The consecutive states and
transitions are demonstrated by the sum of the frequency of Ce
and C f strategies in both sublattices (ρα,Ce + ρα,C f ) as a func-
tion of T for a fixed S and noise level. These curves illustrate
 0.0
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Figure 2: Frequency of Ce and C f strategies in the sublattices vs. T are denoted
by solid (red) lines for S = 1.5 and K = 0.25. The dotted (blue) and dashed
(green) lines indicate the quantities ν(De + C f ) and ν(D f +Ce) and the arrows
show the transition points as explained in the text.
clearly the sublattice ordering in the arrangement of strategies
if T exceeds a threshold value Tc (indicated by the left-hand
vertical arrow in Fig. 2) dependent on K and S . Notice that
these quantities do not indicate the transition that becomes vis-
ible when plotting the total frequency of De and C f [denoted
as ν(De + C f )] strategies as well as ν(D f + Ce). The quanti-
ties ν(De + C f ) and ν(D f + Ce) approach 1 if the two given
strategies (namely a cooperative and a defective strategy) form
a chessboard like pattern. The right-hand arrow in Fig. 2 shows
the value of T where ν(D f +Ce) becomes larger than ν(De+C f ).
Within the coexistence region (at a finite K value) the coopera-
tive (Ce and C f ) as well as the defective (De and D f ) strategies
are located within the same sublattice.
The above analysis is repeated for other values of S at the
same value of noise. The results are summarized in Fig. 3
where the solid lines illustrate the frequency of Ce and C f
strategies in the absence of sublattice ordering (that is, when
ρ1,Ce + ρ1,C f = ρ2,Ce + ρ2,C f ) meanwhile the dashed lines show
the cases of ρ1,Ce + ρ1,C f > ρ2,Ce + ρ2,C f . For the latter curves
the prevalence of De and C f (or D f and Ce) strategies are in-
dicated by the variation of colors. More precisely, different
(green and blue) dashed lines are used to distinguish the cases
of ρ1,Ce > ρ1,C f from the reversed relation. The readers can
observe similar series of transitions in Fig. 2 if T > 1.
 0   1   2   3
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Figure 3: Frequency of cooperation (or portion of Ce and C f strategies) in the
sublattices when varying T and S for K = 0.25. The solid (red) lines refer
to the absence sublattice ordering, the dashed lines indicate sublattice ordered
patterns as described in the text.
For −1 < S < 1 the numerical analysis shows only one
transition from the well-mixed state of the Ce and C f strate-
gies [ρ1,Ce = ρ2,Ce = ρ1,C f = ρ2,C f=1/2] to a sublattice ordered
phase where ρ1,C f and ρ2,De goes to 1 when T is increased from
0 to 3. A third type of transition scenario can be observed in
Fig. 3 in the zero noise limit if S < −1. In the latter case the
high level of cooperation drops suddenly to a low level state at
a threshold value of T increasing linearly with S . For the latter
state De and D f strategies form a well-mixed spatial arrange-
ment. The further increase in T , however, yields a continuous
increase in ρ1,C f = ρ2,C f and above a second threshold value of
T the system transforms into a sublattice ordered state where
ρ1,C f and ρ2,De approaches 1 in the large T limit.
All the above mentioned continuous phase transitions con-
sist of two consecutive phenomena when T is increased. First
the level of cooperation approaches 1/2 and afterward the sub-
lattice ordered structures are built up on the analogy of anti-
ferromagnetic ordering belonging to the Ising universality class
(Stanley, 1971). The effect of noise level (K) is also studied
for several values of parameters. It is found that the width of
transition regions is proportional to K in both sides of the crit-
ical transition point. Consequently, the K dependence of the
above mentioned phases disappear in the zero noise limit and
this fact allows us to determine the phase diagram with the use
of a simple stability analysis as detailed in Section 5.
4. Phase diagram in the low noise limit
Before discussing the above results in the zero noise limit
(K → 0) we briefly survey some general features of this model
if only two strategies are permitted. The simplest behavior can
be observed when all the players are fraternal. In the latter case
C f strategies prevail the whole system if T + S < 2 while the
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D f and C f strategies form a chessboard like structure in the op-
posite case (T +S > 2). For both structures the system achieves
the maximum average payoff, that is, the fraternal players elim-
inate the dilemma (Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2011).
S
T
2
1
0
-1
-2
0 1 2 3
HDH
PDSH
a S
T
2
1
0
-1
-2
0 1 2 3
b
S
T
2
1
0
-1
-2
0 1 2 3
c S
T
2
1
0
-1
-2
0 1 2 3
d
Figure 4: Solutions on T − S plane under different conditions: (a) Nash equi-
libria for two-person one-shot games. The empty, closed, and half-filled circles
indicate cooperative, defective, and mixed strategies while the regions of Har-
mony (H), Hawk-Dove (HD), Stag Hunt (SH) games, and Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) are separated by dashed-dotted lines. Phase diagrams in the zero noise
limit if only fraternal (b), only egoist (c), and both types of players (d) are
present. The colored homogeneous, random, and sublattice-ordered structures
are indicated by the corresponding pattern with the same colors as in Fig. 1.
On the contrary, if all the players are egoist then the strategies
De and Ce form a chessboard like (sublattice ordered) pattern
(i.e., ρ1,De = 1 and ρ2,Ce = 1) when T > 1 and S > 0, otherwise
the cooperators (ρ1,Ce = ρ2,Ce = 1 if T < 1 and S > T − 1) or
the defectors (ρ1,De = ρ2,De = 1 if S < 0 and S < T − 1) form a
homogeneous structure (Szabo´ and Szolnoki, 2011). The above
results are summarized in Figs. 4b-c, where the colored patterns
illustrate the spatial distribution of strategies in the zero noise
limit meanwhile the first plot (a) indicates the possible Nash
equilibria on the four segments of the T − S parameter plane
for the traditional two-person one-shot games. Here it is worth
mentioning that the terminology of the defective and cooper-
ative strategies is not adequate within the region of Harmony
game.
In the presence of all the four strategies the phase diagram
changes drastically for the zero noise limit as indicated in
Fig. 4d where the corresponding phase boundaries are con-
sistent with the results of the analytical stability analysis de-
tailed in the following section. Here one can observe four two-
strategy phases that are missing when only egoist or fraternal
behaviors are permitted (compare the plot d with b or c). It
means, at the same time, that the so-called egoist and frater-
nal players coexist with equal portion in all the four phases.
The coexistence of Ce and C f (as well as De and D f ) strategies
in a random time-dependent structure is a direct consequence
of the equal payoff they receive within the given structures. It
is more important, however, that the boundary separating the
well-mixed Ce + C f and De + D f phases is shifted downward
(compare the plots c and d in Fig. 4) due to the presence of fra-
ternal players. The latter positive effect of the fraternalism on
the elimination of the tragedy of the commons can also be ob-
served in the downward shift (and rotation) of the other phase
boundary (for T > 1) limiting the territory where only De and
D f strategies can survive.
In the four-strategy phase diagram (see Fig. 4d) there is an-
other striking result. Namely, we have found two twofold de-
generated sublattice ordered structures that are different from
those plotted in Figs. 4b and c. For both structures the ego-
ist players achieve the higher utility, that is, they exploit the
fraternal individuals by choosing a suitable option. Within the
upper region (S > T and T + S > 2) D f and Ce strategies build
up a chessboard-like structure, while in the right-hand region
(T > 1, S < T , and S > −T ) the De and C f players form
a similar stable long range ordered spatial arrangement. This
coexistence of the De and C f strategies, however, can not be
maintained if the sucker’s payoff becomes less than a threshold
value, namely, if S < −T .
5. Stability analysis
The above mentioned analytical expressions of the phase
boundaries can be derived by studying the stability of the or-
dered strategy arrangements against the consecutive creation
of different point defects in the low noise limit. This method
proved to be efficient for the investigation of a similar two-
strategy system studied in a previous paper (Szabo´ and Szol-
noki, 2011). Now we briefly survey the extended version of
this approach by considering what happens when we create dif-
ferent point defects in the chessboard-like arrangement of the
De and C f strategies as illustrated in Fig. 5.
De:
Ce:
Df:
Cf:
Figure 5: In the sublattice ordered arrangements of the De and C f strategies
(focal plot) six types of point defects can be created as demonstrated by the
surrounding patterns.
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First we study the case when a C f strategy is substituted for
one of the De strategy in the sublattice ordered structure of De
and C f . For the present dynamical rule the given player fa-
vors this strategy change if it is beneficial for her, namely, if
U(De) = 4T < U(C f ) = 4, where U(De) and U(C f ) denotes
the utility of the given player in the initial and final constel-
lation. The iteration of this elementary step (for any other De
players) drives the system into the homogeneous state where
sx = C f ∀x if T < 1, because the consecutive changes are
performed in one of the sublattices and do not influence each
other. Conversely, in the homogeneous state of C f the players
of sublattice 1 favor the De strategy if T > 1 and the iteration
of these elementary steps yields the chessboard like structure
(see the focal plot of the Fig. 5) where ρ1,C f = ρ2,De = 1. Ev-
idently, if players in the other sublattice (α = 2) are allowed
to modify their strategy then the system evolves into the so-
called anti-chessboard like structure (ρ2,C f = ρ1,De = 1). If any
player can modify her strategy then the iteration of the individ-
ual strategy changes yields a poly-domain structure of the two
equivalent ordered patterns. In the presence of noise, however,
this poly-domain structure evolves into one of the long range
ordered ones through a domain growing process (Bray, 1994).
Consequently, a limited segment of the line T = 1 can be
considered as a phase boundary separating the sublattice or-
dered arrangement of the De and C f strategies from the well
mixed state of Ce and C f players in the T − S plane. The lower
segment of this phase boundary is derived by studying what
happens in the latter sublattice ordered strategy arrangement
(De +C f ) if De and/or D f strategies are substituted for the C f s
in a way described above. The similar analysis gives another
phase boundary (S = −T , for T > 1) separating the sublattice
ordered structure of the De and C f strategies from the region of
”the tragedy of the commons” where only the defective De and
D f players are present.
We do not wish to discuss all the possible cases we studied.
It is worth mentioning, however, that a similar stability analy-
sis of the sublattice ordered structure of the D f and Ce strate-
gies against the substitution of Ce or C f for D f gives the third
phase boundary (S = 2 − T for T < 1) mentioned above. Up
to now we have discussed the derivation of three phase bound-
aries exhibiting a common feature. Namely, if these boundaries
are crossed by increasing T , we can observe similar symmetry
breaking. More precisely, a random structure transforms into a
sublattice ordered one. For low noises these transitions exhibit
similar features characterizing the Ising universality class. De-
viations from this general behavior can occur in the vicinity of
the tricritical points (T = 1 and S = 1 or S = −1) as well as for
high levels of noise when all the four strategies are present with
sufficiently large probabilities.
The phase boundary S = T (T > 1) is curious. Along this
line the straightforward application of the above stability analy-
sis predicts the appearance of metastable states. For example, in
the sublattice ordered arrangement of the De and C f strategies
(see the focal plot of Fig. 5) the random substitution of D f for
De is favored if S > T and the iteration of this process results in
another sublattice ordered pattern where ρ1,C f = ρ2,D f = 1. The
latter structure, however, is unstable against the strategy change
from C f to Ce. This means that the transition from the sublat-
tice ordered structure of the De + C f strategies to the D f + Ce
is performed via the formation of a metastable state if T de-
creased. The story does not ends here, because in the opposite
direction (when T is increased) the transformation is mediated
by the formation of another metastable phase where the Ce and
De strategies form a chessboard like structure. The domains
of these metastable structures are recognizable in the snapshot
Fig. 1c.
The determination of the phase boundary within the region
of the Stag-Hunt game requires a completely different approach
because here the previous stability analysis predicts two stable
phases. Namely, in the well mixed structure of the defective
(De and D f ) strategies the present dynamical rule does not sup-
port the creation of a solitary cooperator (Ce or C f ). Similarly,
the creation of a solitary defector (De or D f ) is also prohibited
in the random distribution of the Ce and C f strategies in the
low noise limit. The situation is analogous to case described
well by the ferromagnetic Ising model. In the absence of an ex-
ternal magnetic field the ferromagnetic system exhibits grow-
ing domains of the two stable structures. During this process
the most relevant two elementary steps (see Fig. 6) are exe-
cuted at random and yield a slow domain growth in the absence
of the external magnetic field. In the presence of the exter-
nal magnetic field, however, one of these two steps is preferred
and one can observe an invasion process whose direction is de-
termined by the variation of total energy. On the analogy of
x y
x y x y
Figure 6: Two elementary steps playing determinant role in the evolution of
interface separating the gray and white phases.
the above mentioned picture we assume that the white area in
Fig. 6 is filled by Ce and C f strategies at random and De and
D f strategies are located on the sites of the gray territory. In
that case the average utility at the defective x site can be given
as 〈Ud(x)〉 = T + σ meantime the average utility at the cooper-
ative y site is 〈Uc(y)〉 = 2 + S + σ. If 〈Ud(x)〉 > 〈Uc(y)〉 then
the (gray) territory of defectors expands and finally the system
evolves into the well mixed state of the De and D f strategies. In
the opposite case the cooperative (Ce and C f ) strategies will in-
vade the whole system. In short, this simple picture predicts
a phase boundary S = T − 2 (T < 0) in the S − T plane
in agreement with a numerical results. Evidently, the present
scenario requires the creation of a nucleon (with two opposite
6
steps) along the straight line interfaces via the noisy effects.
Interestingly, the above criterion of the selection of the win-
ning phase coincides with the prediction of risk dominance in-
troduced by Harsanyi and Selten (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
When applying the suggestion of the risk dominance for the
symmetric games we assume that the players know nothing
about which strategy the opponent(s) will choose. In that case
the possible opponent’s strategies are assumed to be chosen
with equal probabilities and in the spirit of risk dominance the
players favor the choice providing the higher income. Players
x and y (in the upper plot of Fig. 6) are testing the incomes un-
der the same conditions and the favored choice determines the
direction of invasion.
6. Summary
In order to study the spatial competition between the fraternal
end egoist players in the social dilemmas we have introduced a
four strategy evolutionary game where the utilities are related
to the two traditional parameters of the two-strategy games by
revaluating the utilities with respect to their own personality.
The evolution of strategy distribution is governed by a (Glauber
type) myopic strategy update allowing the choice of any other
strategies (involving changes in personality) with a probability
dependent on the variation of the utility between the initial and
final choice. This multi-agent model is analyzed by MC simu-
lations on a square lattice for a low noise level. The resultant
behavior in the final stationary state could be well reproduced
by a simple stability analysis in the low noise limit.
The above investigations have justified that the present sys-
tem evolves into one of the four two-strategy phases where the
egoist and fraternal players coexist by forming either ordered or
disordered spatial strategy distributions in the low noise limit. It
is more important, however, that the presence of fraternal play-
ers has shrunk the territory of ”the tragedy of the commons”.
The latter result can be interpreted as a consequence of the evo-
lutionary processes favoring the coexistence of the selfish (or
exploiting) players with the fraternal ones who make a sacrifice
for the survival of cooperation.
This work was supported by the Hungarian National Re-
search Fund (grant K-101490).
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